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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse a situation where a patent holder is considered as
an upstream ﬁrm who can license its innovation to some downstream companies
that compete on a ﬁnal market with diﬀerentiated products. Licensing contract
may be based either on a royalty or a ﬁxed fee. The patent holder can either be
independant or vertically integrated with one of the downstream companies. We
show that a license based on a royalty works better with vertical integration, and
that consequently, the patent holder have some interest to vertically integrate if
it enables him to apply a royalty based license. The eﬀect of vertical integration
on the social surplus can be either positive or negative.
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It is generally recognised that licensing can represent a large share of the ﬁrms’ proﬁt,
especially in the technology intensive sectors. This fact is associated with the devel-
opment of markets for technologies [Arora et al., 2002], where the upstream actors
develop some new technologies, and the downstream actors incorporate them into
new products or processes in order to improve their competitive position on the ﬁnal
market. In such a setting, a patent holder may choose either to be only an upstream
technology provider (or an outsider innovator), or to vertically integrate some down-
stream activities (becoming then, an insider or an incumbent innovator). With no
vertical integration, the patent holder earns proﬁt only from licensing its innovation.
With vertical integration, the patent holder can either license its innovation or fore-
close its downstream competitor(s). The aim of this paper is to synthesise some
previous ﬁnding about the eﬀect of vertical integration on the optimal licensing prac-
tices, and to analyse the interest of vertical integration both from the patent holder
and the social perspective.
The comparison of diﬀerent payment structure (royalty, ﬁxed fee, auction, two-
part tariﬀ) is a major topic in the literature on the licensing of innovation. The ﬁrst
contributions were more particularly concerned with the interest of a royalty vs aﬁ x e d
fee or an auction mechanism. On the one hand, the theoretical analysis highlights
the interest of a ﬁxed fee (or auction) compared to a royalty, in a context where the
innovator is not vertically integrated [Kamien and Tauman, 1986, Kamien et al., 1992].
On the other hand, the empirical literature shows that royalty based licenses are
rather frequent [Rostocker, 1983, Caves et al., 1983]. Several more recent theoretical
contributions enable to understand this contradiction. Muto [1992] and Poddar and
Sinha [2004] show that a royalty can be preferred to a ﬁxed fee when considering
a market with product diﬀerentiation. It is shown also that there the innovator
has more interest for a royalty when it is vertically integrated with one downstream
licensee [Wang, 1998, Wang and Yang, 1999, Wang, 2002, Kamien and Tauman,
2002]. At last, the innovator has some interest to introduce a royalty in a context
with uncertainty or information asymmetry on the innovation quality [Bousquet et al.,
1998, Gallini and Wright, 1990].
Some recent theoretical analysis have also introduced more complex payment
structure where a royalty can be combined with a ﬁxed fee or an auction [Erutku
and Richelle, 2000, Faul´ ı-Oller and Sandon´ ıs, 2003, Sandon´ ıs and Faul´ ı-Oller, 2003,
Sen and Tauman, 2003]. Such contract is generally preferred by the innovator be-
cause he can then extract a larger share and sometime all the surplus generated by
the innovation.1 This result is not fully coherent with the empirical literature that
1This result can be derived from the fact that corner solutions with only a royalty of a ﬁxed fee
1shows that the use of a simple payment structure is rather frequent:
• Rostocker [1983] analyses the licensing practices of 37 US ﬁrms, and show that
licensing contracts based only on a royalty or a ﬁxed fee occur in 52% of the
cases, while two-part tariﬀ occur in 46% of the cases.
• Macho-Stadler et al. [1996] analyse a sample of 241 licensing contracts between
Spanish ﬁrms (licensees) and foreign companies (licensor), for a large range
of sector at the beginning of the 1990’s. In this sample, more than 80% of
the contract are based only on a royalty or a ﬁxed fee, while only 10% of the
contract are based on two-part tariﬀ.
• Jensen and Thursby [2001] study the licensing practices of 62 universities in the
US between 1991 and 1995. Their survey shows that the universities frequently
combine two types of payment, and in particular a ﬁxed fee and a royalty.
It is diﬃcult to exclude, ap r i o r isome type of licensing contract. Hence, the analysis
of the licensing strategy should be done with a large range of contract.
All the theoretical contributions mentioned before, except one [Sandon´ ıs and Faul´ ı-
Oller, 2003], consider that vertical integration is exogenous. The aim of this paper is
to analyse the optimal licensing strategy when the patent holder can choose whether
or not to vertically integrate in a preliminary stage. By doing so it is possible to better
understand to what extend vertical merger can be explained by motivations related
to the licensing of intellectual property rights, and to analyse the welfare impact of
such mergers.
The analysis is based here on a simple model with no uncertainty and no informa-
tion asymmetry. Competition on the ﬁnal market occurs between two ﬁrms selling
one diﬀerentiated product each. Both Cournot and Bertrand competition are consid-
ered. One of these two ﬁrms is the subsidiary of the upstream patent holder in the
case with vertical integration. Licensing contract may be based either on a royalty
or a ﬁxed fee. This model is identical to the one studied by Muto [1992] with no
vertical integration and Wang and Yang [1999] and Wang [2002] with vertical inte-
gration. Hence the results from these three articles will be synthesised in this paper,
and completed with an analysis of the interest for vertical integration This model is
also identical to the one used by Sandon´ ıs and Faul´ ı-Oller [2003], except that these
authors consider only a payment structure based on two-part tariﬀ. The combined
two papers provide interesting conclusions about vertical integration and licensing
with a large range of payment structures.
generally do not appear at the equilibrium.
2The ﬁrst important result of this paper is that the patent holder always integrates
vertically when only a royalty based license can be used. Two mechanisms explain this
result. First, a royalty is a poor instrument for extracting the net proﬁt let to the
independent downstream licensee. Vertical integration enables a better extraction of
the licensee proﬁt, because he then faces a more competitive environment. Second,
vertical integration enables to better preserve the industry proﬁt when the royalty
is high enough, simply because the double margin is less important (it concerns one
non integrated ﬁrm instead of two).
The second important result is that, when vertical integration is endogenous and
either a royalty or a ﬁxed fee based license can be used, integrated company choose a
royalty while non-integrated company choose a ﬁxed fee. Vertical integration has no
eﬀect on the patent holder proﬁt with a ﬁxed fee (except in some particular cases
which are not relevant here). Hence, the patent holder chooses to vertically integrate
only when a royalty is preferred to a ﬁxed fee.
The paper is organised as follow. The model is presented in the section 1. We ﬁrst
consider the case where the patent holder can only use a royalty based license and
show that he has then always an interest for vertical integration (section 2). However
we know from the literature that a ﬁxed fee can be preferred to a royalty. Hence,
the analysis of the interest for vertical integration is extended to the case where the
patent holder can apply a ﬁxed fee license only (section 3), or the best type of license
between a royalty and a ﬁxed fee (section 4). Extensions with alternative speciﬁcation
of the demand and alternative licensing contracts are addressed in the section 5.
1 The model
The model is ﬁrst presented in a conﬁguration with no vertical integration. The
(minor) modiﬁcations made with vertical integration are presented after.
We consider a ﬁnal market with two diﬀerentiated and competing products. Each
product is produced and sold by a speciﬁc ﬁrm (i =1o ri =2 ) . T w ov e r s i o n s
of each product can be produced depending on whether or not it incorporates an
innovation. In practice this innovation can be considered as an improvement of one
characteristic that increases the propension to pay of the consumers for the product.
It is supposed that each ﬁrm can produce and sell only one version of its product.
The dummy variable θi is used to indicate whether or not the product sold by the
ﬁrm i incorporates (θi =1 )o rn o t( θi = 0) the innovation. The property right of the
innovation is owned by a third actor, called either the patent holder or the upstream
ﬁrm. In contrast, the two ﬁrms 1 and 2 are called the downstream ﬁrms.
3The inverse demand function on the ﬁnal market is deﬁned as follow: 2
pi = a + θiδ − bqi − λbqj (1)
a is the highest propension to pay for the product when it does not incorporate the
innovation (a>0), and δ is the additional propension to pay for the product when it
incorporates the innovation (δ>0). b reﬂects the own price elasticity of the demand
(b>0). λ reﬂects the degree of substituability between the product (λ ∈ [0,1]). The
case where λ = 0 corresponds to a maximum diﬀerentiation of the product: the two
products are sold on two diﬀerent and independent ﬁnal markets. Conversely, when
λ = 1 the two products are perfect substitutes.
The innovation is patent-protected and can be incorporated in one product if a
license contract is signed with the patent holder. Two types of licensing contract
are considered in this paper: (i) a royalty based license where the licensee pays w
to the patent holder for each unit he sells, (ii) a ﬁxed fee based license, where the
licensee pays F to the patent holder whatever the quantity he sells. With both types
of agreement, the contracts are supposed to be public. The marginal production cost
of the ﬁrm i is c + θiw. Note also that since the upstream ﬁrm only sells a right to
access to some intellectual property, its marginal cost is equal to zero3.
The interactions between the actors are structured in three stages. First the patent
holder decides the type of licensing contract and the corresponding variable (w with
ar o y a l t y ,F with a ﬁxed fee). The same contract is proposed to the two downstream
ﬁrms. Second, each of the downstream ﬁrm decides whether he accepts or refuses the
license contract (decision variable θi). Third, competition occurs on the ﬁnal market
with either Cournot or Bertrand competition.
An alternative conﬁguration will be considered, where the patent holder and one
of the two downstream ﬁrms are vertically integrated. The subscript v is then used
to refer to the vertically integrated ﬁrm and the subscript s is used to refer to the
independent downstream ﬁrm. The vertically integrated company gives a free access
to the innovation to its subsidiary. The three stages presented before are still valid
with vertical integration. The only diﬀerence is that, at the stage 2, we are concerned
2This demand function can be derived from the utility function of a representative consumer
deﬁned as follow:




1 +2 λq1q2 + q2
2)
See Singh and Vives [1984] for a detailed analysis of the duopoly equilibrium with such a demand
function.
3The cost of the research that leads to the patent is supposed to be already spend because we
are not considering the research stage in this model.
4with the decision of only one downstream ﬁrm (the ﬁrm s), instead of two with no
vertical integration.
The choice of whether or not to integrate vertically is done before the three basic
stages described before. We suppose here that the patent holder has an interest to
integrate vertically one licensee if it leads to an increase of their joint proﬁt. Note
that, with such an hypothesis, there is no cost associated with vertical integration.
The resolution is made by backward induction. The three basic stages will be
solved ﬁrst and the choice concerning vertical integration will be analysed after.
Note also that the stage 1 resolution indirectly leads the patent holder to choose
a certain level of access restriction to the innovation. Access restriction is deﬁned
as follow: there is no access restriction when the innovation is incorporated in the
two products, a partial access restriction when the innovation is incorporated in
only one product, and a complete access restriction when no product incorporate
the innovation. By construction, complete access restriction never appears at the
equilibrium with vertical integration because the innovation is sold at least by v.
2 Analysis with a royalty based license
The resolution is presented ﬁrst in details with Cournot competition (section 2.1
to 2.3). The diﬀerences that appears with Bertrand competiton are brieﬂy presented
after (section 2.4)
2.1 Stages 3 and 2 subgames
The stages 3 and 2 subgames determine the behavior of the ﬁrms on the ﬁnal market
with given licensing contract (i.e. given value of w).
2.1.1 Stage 3
The stage 3 equilibrium depends on the vertical structure, the incorporation of the
innovation in the product (value of θi or θs) and the production cost.
Two types of equilibrium are possible at the stage 3 (table 1): a duopoly equi-
librium where the two competitors have positive sales and proﬁt, and a monopoly
equilibrium where only one competitor have positive sales and proﬁt. The monopoly
equilibrium can appear if only one ﬁrm incorporates the innovation and if the inno-
vation is important enough. δM is the minimum value of δ over which the innovation
is drastic4 (δM =( 2− λ)(a − c)/λ). A drastic innovation is a necessary (but not
4Remind that, following Arrow [1962], an innovation is drastic if the competitor of the innovator
cannot make positive proﬁt when the innovator applies the monopoly price.
5Table 1: Condition for having the diﬀerent types of stage 3 equilibrium
Duopoly Monopoly
With no vertical θi = θj or θi  = θj and δ ≥ δM + w
integration θi  = θj and δ<δ M + w
With vertical θs =1o r θs =0a n dδ ≥ δM
integration θs =0a n dδ<δ M
suﬃcient) condition for having a monopoly equilibrium.
The detailed characteristics of the stage 3 equilibrium are given in the appendix A.
With no vertical integration, the gross proﬁt of the ﬁrm i at the stage 3 is πi(w,θi,θ j)
when its competitor j chooses θj at the stage 2. With vertical integration, the gross
proﬁt of the ﬁrm s (resp. v)i sπs(w,θs) (resp. πv(w,θs)). The notations p and q
(instead of π) are used to refer to the prices and quantities at the stage 3 equilibrium.
At last, note that the stage 3 equilibrium would be identical with a model where
the innovation enables to decrease the production cost from c to c − δ, but does not
aﬀect the product characteristics. This alternative modelling is the one used by most
of the contribution on licensing [c.f. for example Wang, 2002]. This equivalence for
the stage 3 implies that all the other results concerning the previous stages are also
identical.
2.1.2 Stage 2
With no vertical integration, and a given choice of the ﬁrm j, the ﬁrm i accepts the
license if its proﬁt increases. Formally, we have:
πi(w,1,θ j) ≥ πi(w,0,θ j) ⇔ w ≤ ˆ wNI with ˆ wNI = δ
Two equilibrium are possible: if w ≤ ˆ wNI the two ﬁrms accept the license because the
best response of each ﬁrm is to accept the license whatever the choice of its competitor;
and conversely, if w>ˆ wNI the two ﬁrms reject the license because the best response
of each ﬁrm is to reject the license whatever the choice of its competitor. Partial
access restriction never appears at the equilibrium with a royalty and no vertical
integration.
With vertical integration and a non drastic innovation, the ﬁrm s accepts the
license if:
πs(w,1) ≥ πs(w,0) ⇔ w ≤ ˆ wI with ˆ wI = δ
With a drastic innovation the ﬁrm s accepts the license because he earns no proﬁt
otherwise.
62.2 Stage 1 subgame
At the stage 1, the patent holder chooses the royalty level that maximises its proﬁt.
From now on, the patent holder proﬁt is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the industry
proﬁt and the downstream and non-integrated ﬁrm. Such a deﬁnition enables to
better understand the decisions of the patent holder by analysing the eﬀect on these
two components.
The industry proﬁt respectively with no vertical integration and with vertical
integration is deﬁned as follow:
ΠNI(w,θ1,θ 2)=w(θ1 · q1(w,θ1,θ 2)+θ2 · q2(w,θ2,θ 1)) + π1(w,θ1,θ 2)+π2(w,θ2,θ 1)
ΠI(w,θs)=πv(w,θs)+πs(w,θs)
The patent holder proﬁt is ΠNI(w,θ1,θ 2) − πi(w,θ1,θ 2) − πi(w,θ2,θ 1)w i t hn o
vertical integration, and ΠI(w,θs) − πs(w,θs) with vertical integration.
The stage 1 resolution is made as follow: ﬁrst, we search for the optimal roy-
alty level with no access restriction and, second, we analyse the interest for access
restriction. In-between, we analyse the eﬀect of the royalty level on the industry
proﬁt.
2.2.1 Stage 1 with no access restriction
Solving the stage 1 with no access restriction corresponds to the search for a local
optimal royalty level, such that w<ˆ wNI with no vertical integration and such that
w<ˆ wI with vertical integration.
With no vertical integration, we have:
argmaxw [ΠNI(w,1,1) − 2πi(w,1,1)] = ˜ wNI with ˜ wNI =
a − c + δ
2
This royalty level is lower than ˆ wNI if δ is high enough. Consequently, with no access





ˆ wNI if δ<δ NI with δNI = a − c
˜ wNI otherwise
(2)
Thereafter, the optimal royalty level is qualiﬁed as constrained if w∗
NI =ˆ wNI and
unconstrained if w∗
NI =˜ wNI.
The similar resolution can be made with vertical integration. The patent holder
chooses an optimal unconstrained royalty level (w∗
I =˜ wI) if the innovation is impor-
tant enough (δ ≥ δI), and a constrained level (w∗
I =ˆ wI)o t h e r w i s e :
˜ wI =
8 − 4λ2 + λ3
8 − 3λ2 ·
a − c + δ
2
and δI =
8 − 4λ2 + λ3
8 − 2λ2 − λ3 · (a − c)( 3 )








2.2.2 Industry proﬁt with no access restriction
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀect of the royalty level on the industry proﬁt, and then analyse
the industry proﬁt when the patent holder chooses the optimal unconstrained royalty
level.
Lemma 1 With no access restriction the industry proﬁt is concave in w. Moreover,
the industry proﬁt is strictly greater with vertical integration if and only if the royalty
level is high enough:
ΠI(w,1) > ΠNI(w,1,1) ⇔ w>w NI/I
The ﬁgure 1 illustrates this result. ΠFI is the proﬁt of the fully integrated ﬁrm
and corresponds to the benchmark case where the patent holder vertically integrates
the two downstream companies.
8A qualitative explanation of this result is provided here (see appendix B for a
detailed proof). The industry proﬁt is aﬀected by the royalty level through two
opposite eﬀects:
• A competition relaxing eﬀect.A n i n c r e a s e o f w leads to an increase of the
production cost of the licensees, and to an increase of their prices on the ﬁnal
market.
• A double margin eﬀect [Spengler, 1950]. The royalty causes a negative vertical
externality between the licensee and the patent holder. More precisely, the
decision taken by the licensee is based on a higher production cost compared to
the one of a vertically integrated company (c+w instead of c). As a consequence,
the licensee’s strategy leads to too low quantities on the ﬁnal market.
These two eﬀects explain why the industry proﬁt is concave in w.W h e n w is low
enough, the double margin eﬀect is very small, and the industry proﬁt is increasing
in w because of the competition relaxing eﬀect. Conversely, when the royalty level
is very high the double margin eﬀect becomes dominant, and the industry proﬁt is
decreasing in w. Note that the maximum industry level (ΠFI) can be reached with
no vertical integration and an intermediary royalty level.
These two eﬀects are more important with no vertical integration because the
royalty aﬀects the production cost of two licensees instead of one. When w =0 ,
the industry proﬁt is equal with or without vertical integration because there is no
competition relaxing eﬀect and no double margin eﬀect (the formal proof will be given
latter with the lemma 6). If w increases from 0, the industry proﬁt increases more
rapidly with no vertical integration, because the competition relaxing eﬀect is more
important in this case. In other words, there is always a small enough value of w such
that the industry proﬁt is greater with no vertical integration5. Conversely, when w
is very high, the industry proﬁt is higher with vertical integration because the double
margin eﬀect is less important in this case. By the continuity of the proﬁt function,
we can ﬁnally conclude that there is an intermediary level of w such that the industry
proﬁt is equal with or without vertical integration.
Lemma 2 The optimal unconstrained royalty level (˜ wI or ˜ wNI) is greater than the
royalty level that maximises the industry proﬁt.
The main interest of this lemma is to give a simple explanation of the determina-
tion of the optimal unconstrained royalty level. With vertical integration, ˜ wI is such
5rigorously, one should observe that this result holds only when λ>0. Conversely, when λ =0 ,
the industry faces two independent downstream markets, each downstream ﬁrm being a monopoly
on each downstream market. There is no competition relaxing eﬀect, and consequently, the industry










Since the proﬁt of the licensee is decreasing with the royalty level, the industry proﬁt
is necessarily decreasing when w =˜ wI. In other words, the optimal unconstrained
royalty level is such that the marginal gain from reducing the proﬁt of the licensee
is equal to the marginal lost of industry proﬁt. Because of the concave form of the
proﬁt function, when the industry proﬁt is decreasing, the royalty level is greater than
the royalty level that maximises the industry proﬁt. The equivalent argument can be
made with no vertical integration.
2.2.3 Interest for access restriction
The objective here is to search for the optimal global royalty level at the stage 1.
With vertical integration, we compare the proﬁt with w∗
I (no access restriction) and
the proﬁt with w>ˆ wI (partial access restriction). With no vertical integration, we
compare the proﬁt with w∗
NI (no access restriction) and the proﬁt with w>ˆ wNI
(complete access restriction).
Lemma 3 With a royalty based license, the patent holder prefers not to restrict the
access at the stage 1 equilibrium, with either vertical or no vertical integration.
With vertical integration, this result has already been established in the litera-
ture [Wang, 2002, Wang and Yang, 1999] with process innovation. This result is also
valid here because the characteristics of the stage 3 equilibrium are similar. In ad-
dition to these contributions, we discuss here the eﬀect of access restriction on the
industry and licensee proﬁts.





I,1) > ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0)
⇔ ΠI(w
∗
I,1) − ΠI(0,0) >π s(w
∗
I,1) − πs(0,0)
The term on the right hand side of the second inequality is positive (otherwise the
ﬁrm s would refuse the licence agreement at the stage 2): access restriction enables
to decrease the proﬁt of the independent ﬁrm s. However, access restriction leads
also to a decrease of the industry proﬁt for two reasons:
• First, the innovation is distributed less widely, and consequently less proﬁt is
earned from it. This eﬀect is more important when the products are weak
substitute (λ close to 0). In such a case the market share of the product sold
by s, that does not incorporate the innovation, can still be large with access
restriction.
10• Second, foreclosure prevents the patent holder from using the competition re-
laxing eﬀect of the royalty described before (cf. lemma 1). Access restriction
leads to a more intensive competition on the ﬁnal market and to a lower indus-
try proﬁt. This eﬀect is more important when the products are close substitutes
(λ close to 1).
Finally, foreclosure is never interesting with a royalty because it leads to a more
important decrease of the industry proﬁt, compared to the decrease of the proﬁt let
to the ﬁrm s.
With no vertical integration, the interest for no access restriction is straightfor-
ward: partial access restriction cannot appear at the stage 2 equilibrium, and the
patent holder earns no proﬁt with complete access restriction. One could wonder
however if partial access restriction could be interesting with a modiﬁed version of
the model such that partial access restriction can appear at the equilibrium. We can
suppose for example that the patent holder can credibly commit to sign only one
license agreements at the beginning of the stage 1, before choosing the level of the
royalty. However, it can be shown that the lemma 3 still holds, with this modiﬁed
version of the model.
2.3 The eﬀects of vertical integration
The objective of this section is to show that a royalty based license works better with
vertical integration, so that the patent holder always prefers to integrate vertically.
Note ﬁrst that the comparison needs to be made with diﬀerent royalty level, since
vertical integration aﬀects the optimal royalty level. With Cournot competition on
the ﬁnal market, the optimal royalty level with vertical integration is always lower
or equal to the level with no vertical integration but the diﬀerence between the two
values is small (w∗
NI/w∗
I ∈ [0.97,1]).
Lemma 4 With a royalty based license (and no access restriction), vertical integra-






The intuition behind this result is simple (see appendix C for a detailed proof).
Since the two products sold on the ﬁnal market incorporate the innovation, the dif-
ference of the licensee proﬁt is caused by the diﬀerence of production cost. With
vertical integration the licensee (ﬁrm s) faces a competitor with a lower production
cost than with no vertical integration, because the competitor has a free access to the
innovation in the former case, while he pays a royalty in the last case. Rigorously,
11one have to observe also that the production cost of the licensee is lower with vertical
integration, because of the lower royalty level. However this last eﬀect is negligible
compared to the ﬁrst one.
Proposition 1 With royalty based licensing contract only, the patent holder has al-
ways an interest for vertical integration.
Vertical integration leads to an increase of the social surplus (Cournot speciﬁc).





















The term on the right hand side of the ﬁrst inequality is the joint proﬁt between the
patent holder (in square brackets) and one licensee. We have just shown (lemma 4),
that the term on the right hand side of the second inequality is negative. Two cases
have to be considered in order to check the second inequality:
• With important enough innovations (δ ≥ δNI), the royalty level is uncon-
strained. We have seen (lemma 2) that the unconstrained optimal royalty level
is then high in order to moderate the proﬁt let to the licensee(s). We have seen
also (lemma 1) that the industry proﬁt is greater with vertical integration if
the royalty levels is greater than wNI/I. With Cournot competition, it can be
shown that the unconstrained optimal royalty level is greater than wNI/I (cf.
appendix D). Hence, the patent holder prefers to integrate vertically because
it enables both to increase the industry proﬁt and to decrease the proﬁt let to
the licensee.
• With small innovations (δ<δ NI), the royalty level is constrained at least with
no vertical integration. With very small innovation, the industry proﬁt can
be lower with vertical innovation but, because of the constraint on the royalty
level, the diﬀerence of proﬁt let to the licensee is then more important, so that
the patent holder still prefers to integrate vertically (cf. appendix D).
Vertical integration leads to an increase of the social surplus because the prices
on the ﬁnal market are lower with vertical integration. Two results explain this
property. First, with a given royalty level, the prices are lower with vertical integration
(pv(w,1) <p s(w,1) <p i(w,1,1)) because the competition is then more intense.
Second, the optimal royalty level is lower with vertical integration (w∗
I ≤ w∗
NI). Note
however that this last result is speciﬁc to the Cournot competition.
122.4 Analysis with Bertrand competition on the ﬁnal market
With Bertrand competition, three types of equilibrium appear at the stage 3: a
duopoly and a monopoly equilibrium like with Cournot competition, and, in-between,
a constrained monopoly. In the constrained monopoly, only one ﬁrm has positive sales,
but he is constrained to apply a limit price lower than the monopoly price in order
to keep the competitor out of the market 6.
All the lemma and proposition established with Cournot competition are still valid
with Bertrand competition, except one: vertical integration can lead to a surplus
decrease if the products are close substitutes and the innovation is minor. This
result comes from the fact that the maximum royalty level deﬁned from the stage 2
resolution can be much higher with vertical integration ( ˆ wI > ˆ wNI) especially when
the product are close substitutes. As a consequence, when the optimal royalty level
with no vertical integration is constrained (i.e. when δ is small), the optimal royalty
can be much higher with vertical integration. Such a high royalty level can leads to
higher prices on the ﬁnal market, and to a surplus decrease.
3 Analysis with a ﬁxed fee based license
The stage 3 resolution made with a royalty is valid with a ﬁxed fee: the gross proﬁt
with a ﬁxed fee is equal to the gross proﬁt with a royalty when w = 0. All the analysis
made in this section is valid both with Cournot and Bertrand competition on the ﬁnal
market.
3.1 Stages 2 and 1 resolution
As in the case with a royalty, we ﬁrst search for the local optimal ﬁxed fee level with
a given level of access restriction. We then analyse the interest for access restriction,
which corresponds to a search for the global optimal ﬁxed fee.
3.1.1 Fixed fee with a given access restriction
At the stage 2, the decision of one potential licensee is based on its net proﬁt, deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the gross proﬁt and the ﬁxed fee F.
- With no vertical integration, the downstream ﬁrm i accepts the license in the
following cases:
6More details on this equilibrium with limit pricing can be found in Muto [1992]
13• If its competitor j also accepts the license, then we need to have:
πi(0,1,1)−F ≥ πi(0,0,1) ⇔ F ≤ F2 with: F2 = πi(0,1,1)−πi(0,0,1)
• If j reject the license, then i accepts the license if F ≤ F1 with F1 = πi(0,1,0)−
πi(0,0,0)
After observing that F2 is always lower than F1 (cf. appendix E), we can conclude
that three equilibrium are possible at the stage 2:
• If F<F 2 <F 1, then the best response of i is to accept the license whatever
the choice of its competitor. At the equilibrium the two downstream ﬁrms
accept the license (no access restriction). The net proﬁt of the licensee is then
πi(0,0,1).
• If F2 <F<F 1, then the best response of i is to accept the license if its com-
petitor rejects it, and to reject the license if its competitor accepts it. At the
equilibrium, only one of the downstream ﬁrm accepts the license (partial access
restriction). Two equilibrium are possible ((θ1,θ 2) ∈{ (1,0),(0,1)}) but they
both lead to the same results because the two downstream ﬁrms are symmet-
ric. The net proﬁt of the licensee is πi(0,0,0) and the proﬁt of the excluded
downstream ﬁrm is πi(0,0,1).
• If F2 <F 1 <F , then the best response of the ﬁrm i is to reject the license
whatever the choice of its competitor. At the equilibrium both downstream
ﬁrms reject the license (complete access restriction).
- With vertical integration, the ﬁrm s accepts the license if:
πs(0,1) − F ≥ πs(0,0) ⇔ F ≤ FI with: FI = πs(0,1) − πs(0,0)
The net proﬁt of the licensee is πs(0,0) whatever its choice at the period 2. Note that
we always have FI = F2. This result will be established in the proof of the lemma 6.
-S y n t h e s i s . At the stage 1, the patent holder choose F = F2 = FI if he decides
not to restrict the access (with both vertical structure). If he decides to have a partial
access restriction, the patent holder choose F = F1 with no vertical integration and
F>F I with vertical integration. The table 2 synthesises the net proﬁt of the ﬁrms
with the diﬀerent restriction level and vertical structure. As we made before with
royalty license, the patent holder proﬁt is expressed as the diﬀerence between the
industry proﬁt and the net proﬁt of the downstream independent ﬁrms.
14Table 2: Net proﬁt of the ﬁrms with a ﬁxed fee
With no vertical integration With vertical integration
No access restriction (F = F2 or F = FI)
Patent holder ΠNI(0,1,1) − 2πi(0,0,1) ΠI(0,1) − πs(0,0)
Each licensee πi(0,0,1) πs(0,0)
Partial access restriction (F = F1 or F>F I)
Patent holder ΠNI(0,0,1) − πi(0,0,0) − πi(0,0,1) ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0)
Licensee πi(0,0,0)
Excluded ﬁrm πi(0,0,1) πs(0,0)
Compared to the royalty based license, a new equilibrium with partial access
restriction can appear with no vertical integration. This equilibrium exists because
there is a range of value for the fee (F2 <F≤ F1) where the best response of each
downstream ﬁrm is to make the converse choice compared to the competitor.
3.1.2 Interest for access restriction
Lemma 5 With a ﬁxed fee license, the patent holder prefers to restrict (partially)
the access if the innovation is important enough and if the products are close enough
substitutes.
The ﬁgure 2 illustrates this result. This result has already been established in the
literature in the case with vertical integration [Wang, 2002], and can be extended to
the case with no vertical integration.
Note ﬁrst that complete access restriction is excluded from the analysis either
because it leads to no proﬁt for the patent holder (with no vertical integration) or
because it is not possible by construction (with vertical integration).
With vertical integration, the patent holder prefers to restrict the access if it leads
to an increase of the industry proﬁt:
ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0) > ΠI(0,1) − πs(0,0) ⇔ ΠI(0,0) > ΠI(0,1)
With no vertical integration, the condition is diﬀerent but the increase of the industry
proﬁt is still a necessary condition.
Access restriction aﬀects the industry proﬁt through two opposite eﬀects:
• On the one hand, access restriction enables to increase the market power of the
ﬁrm that distributes exclusively the innovation. Formally, we have pv(0,0) >













Access restriction is prefered only with vertical integration
Access restriction is prefered both with and without vertical integration
16pv(0,1) with vertical integration and πi(0,1,0) >π i(0,1,1) with no vertical
integration. The variation of market power caused by access restriction is more
important when the products are close substitute because the industry proﬁt
with no access restriction is then lower. Moreover, the market power provided
by the access restriction increases when the innovation is important enough.
• On the other hand, some demand are harder to be satisﬁed with access restric-
tion. In other words, the quantity of innovation sold is more important when
the innovation is incorporated in two products (non-restricted access) instead
of one (partial access restriction). This negative eﬀect is less important when
the product are close substitute and when the innovation is important enough.
Finally, with close enough substitute and important enough innovation, the positive
eﬀect of access restriction on the industry proﬁt increases while the negative eﬀect
decreases.
3.2 Eﬀects of vertical integration
We can observe from the ﬁgure 2 that the conditions where the patent holder prefers
access restriction are diﬀerent depending on whether or not there is vertical inte-
gration. This result will now be explained, and we will see that it determines the
condition for having an interest for vertical integration.
3.2.1 Eﬀect of vertical integration on the industry proﬁt
Lemma 6 With a ﬁxed fee and a given restriction of the access to the innovation,
the proﬁt of the industry is identical with or without vertical integration:
ΠI(0,θ)=Π NI(0,1,θ)=Π NI(0,θ,1)
θ =0with partial access restriction, and θ =1with no access restriction.
With a given access restriction, the level of the ﬁxed fee does not aﬀect the pro-
duction cost of the two downstream companies, and consequently does not aﬀect the
equilibrium on the ﬁnal market. Fixed fee aﬀects only the transfer among ﬁrms but
not the industry proﬁt.
The proﬁt of v is equal to the gross proﬁt of one licensee with no vertical integra-
tion. Similarly, the gross proﬁt of s is equal to the gross proﬁt of one downstream
ﬁrm with no vertical integration, knowing that its competitor is a licensee. Formally
we have:
πv(0,θ)=πi(0,1,θ)a n dπs(0,θ)=πi(0,θ,1) (4)
17In passing, note that one consequence of this result is that F2 = FI.
The industry proﬁt are also identical because:
ΠNI(0,θ,1) = πi(0,θ,1) + πi(0,1,θ)=πs(0,θ)+πv(0,θ)=Π I(0,θ)
3.2.2 Eﬀect of vertical integration on the interest for access restriction
Proposition 2 With ﬁxed fee, if the patent holder prefers to restrict (partially) the
access with no vertical integration, then he prefers also to restrict the access with
vertical integration. Equivalently, if the patent holder prefers not to restrict the access
with vertical integration, then he prefers also not to restrict the access with no vertical
integration.
Suppose that the patent holder prefers to restrict the access with no vertical
integration:
ΠNI(0,1,0)− πi(0,0,0)− πi(0,0,1) > ΠNI(0,1,1) − 2πi(0,0,1)
⇔ ΠNI(0,1,0)− ΠNI(0,1,1) >π i(0,0,0)− πi(0,0,1)
The term on the right hand side of the second inequality is positive: access restriction
leads to an increase of the licensee’s net proﬁt with no vertical integration. The term
on the left hand side is equivalent with vertical integration: ΠI(0,0) − ΠI(0,1) =
ΠNI(0,1,0) − ΠNI(0,1,1) (cf. lemma 6). The previous inequality implies that:
ΠI(0,0) − ΠI(0,1) >π i(0,0,0)− πi(0,0,1) > 0
The industry proﬁt with vertical integration increases with access restriction, and
consequently the patent holder prefers to restrict the access with vertical integration.
In summary, access restriction is more often preferred with vertical integration
because it does not lead to an increase of the licensee net proﬁt as it does with no
vertical integration.
Corollary 1 W i t haﬁ x e df e e ,t h e r ei sas e to fp a r a m e t e r sv a l u ef o rλ and δ such
that the patent holder has an interest for a partial access restriction with vertical
integration but no interest for access restriction with no vertical integration.
The ﬁgure 2 illustrates this corollary.
183.2.3 Interest of the patent holder for vertical integration
Proposition 3 With a ﬁxed fee, there is an interest for vertical integration only if it
enables the patent holder to move from a strategy with no access restriction (with no
vertical integration) to a strategy with access restriction (with vertical integration).
Vertical integration leads to a decrease of the social surplus.
If vertical integration does not aﬀect the equilibrium on the ﬁnal market, then
there is no interest for vertical integration because it does not aﬀect the joint proﬁt
of the patent holder and one licensee7.
Suppose now that the parameters are such that there is an interest for access
restriction only with vertical integration (cf. corollary 1). We have:
ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0) > ΠI(0,1) − πs(0,0)
Using the lemma 6, this expression is equivalent to:
ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0) > [ΠNI(0,1,1)− 2πi(0,0,1)] + πi(0,0,1)
The term on the right hand side is the joint proﬁt of the patent holder and one licensee
with no vertical integration and no access restriction. Hence, the patent holder prefers
to integrate vertically in this case.
With a ﬁxed fee, the surplus is maximum with no access restriction because the
innovation is then integrated in the two products and the the marginal cost of the
licensee is minimal. Vertical integration leads to a decrease of the social surplus
because it is chosen only if it enables to move from no access restriction (i.e. maximum
surplus) to access restriction (i.e. non-maximum surplus).
7More precisely, if no access restriction if preferred in both cases, it leads to the same joint proﬁt:
[ΠNI(0,1,1)− 2πi(0,0,1)]+ πi(0,0,1) = ΠI(0,1) − πs(0,0)
On the left hand side, the ﬁrst term in square brackets is the patent holder proﬁt and the second
term is the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrm that can be integrated. The term on the right hand side
is the proﬁt of the vertically integrated company.
If partial access restriction is preferred in both cases, the joint proﬁt is not aﬀected by vertical
integration:
[ΠNI(0,1,0)− πi(0,0,1) − πi(0,0,0)]+ πi(0,0,0) = ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0)
194 Analysis with a royalty or a ﬁxed fee based li-
cense
We consider here that the patent holder chooses ﬁrst whether of not to integrate ver-
tically and then the best type of license between a royalty and a ﬁxed fee. Thereafter,
the three basic stages of the model take place. Consequently, the best type of license
is analyzed ﬁrst and the analysis of the interest for vertical integration after. All the
analysis presented here is valid both with Cournot and Bertrand competition on the
ﬁnal market.
4.1 Interest for ﬁxed fee vs royalty
Lemma 7 With no access restriction, the net proﬁt of a licensee is lower with a ﬁxed








With a royalty, the net proﬁt of a licensee is equal to its gross proﬁt. With a ﬁxed
fee, the net proﬁts are deﬁned in the table 2.
With vertical integration and a royalty, the licensee accepts the contract if the
royalty is lower than a maximum level ( ˆ wI such that πs(ˆ wI,1) = πs(0,0)). Moreover,
knowing that w∗
I ≤ ˆ wI and that the proﬁt of the licensee is decreasing in w,w eh a v e :
πs(w
∗
I,1) ≥ πs(ˆ wI,1) = πs(0,0)
With no vertical integration, the net proﬁt of the licensee with a ﬁxed fee is lower




NI,1,1) ≥ πi(ˆ wNI,1,1) = πi(0,0,0) ≥ πi(0,0,1)
Proposition 4 If the patent holder prefers to apply a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty
with vertical integration, then he prefers to apply a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty with
no vertical integration. Equivalently, if the patent holder prefers to apply a royalty
rather than a ﬁxed fee with no vertical integration, then he prefers to apply a royalty
rather than ﬁxed fee with vertical integration.
20This property is the indirect consequence of the fact that a royalty license works
better with vertical integration, while the proﬁt with a ﬁxed fee (and no access re-
striction) are equivalent with or without vertical integration. Hence the patent holder
prefers more often to use a royalty with vertical integration. Interestingly, the proof
is based only on the previous lemma and propositions.
We suppose that the patent holder prefers to use a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty
with no vertical integration.
Note ﬁrst that, with vertical integration, a ﬁxed fee with partial access restriction
cannot be preferred to a royalty. With vertical integration and access restriction, the
patent holder earns the same proﬁt (ΠI(0,0)−πs(0,0)) with any type of contract be-
cause there is no contract. We have seen that there is no interest for access restriction
with a royalty (lemma 3). Hence, the patent holder proﬁt with vertical integration is
always greater with a royalty (and no access restriction) compared to a ﬁxed fee and
partial access restriction.
We now suppose that the patent holder prefers to use a ﬁxed fee and no access
restriction rather than a royalty with vertical integration:





Using the proposition 1, we know that the proﬁt with a royalty and vertical integration
(right hand side) is greater to the joint proﬁt of the patent holder and one licensee
with a royalty and no vertical integration. Consequently, we have:





Using the lemma 6, we can replace the term on the left hand side by there equivalence
with no vertical integration:





At last, we subtract πi(0,0,1) on both sides, and we use the lemma 7, to get:










This last inequality indicates that the patent holder prefers to use a royalty rather
than a the ﬁxed fee with no vertical integration.
Corollary 2 There is a set of parameters value for λ and δ such that the patent
holder uses a royalty based license rather than a ﬁxed fee based license with verti-
cal integration, and the converse (a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty) with no vertical
integration.
The ﬁgure 3 illustrates this corollary.













Royalty is prefered to a ﬁxed fee only with vertical integration
Royalty is prefered to a ﬁxed fee both with and without vertical integration
224.2 Interest for vertical integration
Proposition 5 If the patent holder can use either a ﬁxed fee or a royalty based li-
cense, there is a net interest for vertical integration if and only if it leads the patent
holder to choose a royalty based licensing contract.
Suppose ﬁrst that the patent holder prefers a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty with
vertical integration. He has then no interest for access restriction with both types
of license. By the proposition 4, the patent holder prefers also a ﬁxed fee rather
than a royalty with no vertical integration (with no access restriction in the two
case). Using the proposition 3, we conclude that the patent holder has no interest for
vertical integration.
Suppose now that the patent holder prefers to use a royalty rather than a ﬁxed
fee with vertical integration. Two sub-cases have to be considered:
• If he prefers also to use a royalty rather than a ﬁxed fee with no vertical inte-
gration, then by proposition 1 we conclude he prefers to integrate vertically.
• If he prefers also to use a ﬁxed fee rather than a royalty with no vertical integra-
tion, then the preference of a royalty over a ﬁxed fee with vertical integration
is equivalent to the preference of a royalty with vertical integration to a ﬁxed
fee with no vertical integration because the proﬁt with a ﬁxed fee and a given
access restriction is not aﬀected by vertical integration. Hence the patent holder
prefers to integrate vertically (more details can be found in the appendix F).
The eﬀect of vertical integration on the social surplus can be either positive or
negative. With Cournot competition, the patent holder always prefers to apply ﬁxed
fee rather than royalty with no vertical integration. Vertical integration leads to an
increase (resp. a decrease) of the social surplus if the patent holder would choose to
restrict (resp. not to restrict) the access with no vertical integration (cf. appendix F).
5 Discussion
5.1 Alternative demand function
The demand function used in this paper is common in the economic literature and in
most of the paper on the licencing of innovation with diﬀerentiated products. However
over speciﬁcation of the demand with product diﬀerentiation are possible.
It can be observed that the results with a ﬁxed fee or a royalty (section 4) are
all derived from the previous results with only one type of license (either a ﬁxed fee
or a royalty). We expect the result with a ﬁxed fee only (section 3) to be robust
23with a large range of demand function8. The results with only a royalty based license
(section 2) are speciﬁc to this demand function. However, only two particular results
are important for the rest of paper: the patent holder never prefers to restrict the
access (lemma 3) and always prefers to integrate vertically (proposition 1). Finally,
the main results from this paper are valid with alternative demand function if these
two particular results are checked.
A counter-example can be ﬁnd in Poddar and Sinha [2004] who consider a demand
function based on the hotelling model where the two downstream ﬁrms are positioned
at the two extremes of the segment.9 With such a model, the optimal royalty level
corresponds to the value of the innovation (δ) either with or without vertical inte-
gration. The patent holder does not increase its proﬁt by integrating vertically a
licensee. This results comes from the fact that the whole demand is served with any
value of the royalty. Hence there is no double margin eﬀect with such a model, and
consequently no interest for vertical integration.
5.2 Alternative licensing contract
Auctions and two-part tariﬀ are the two alternative types of licensing contract com-
monly considered in the literature on the licensing of innovation.
Consider ﬁrst the case where the patent holder can sell a certain number of li-
censes through a ﬁrst price auction mechanisms. Applying such a mechanism here
makes sense only when there is at least two potential bidders (i.e. with no vertical
integration). We know from the literature [Katz and Shapiro, 1986] that auction and
ﬁxed fee lead to the same proﬁt with no access restriction if the patent holder can
impose a minimum bid. With access restriction, auction is more eﬃcient than ﬁxed
fee because it enables to reduce the net proﬁt let to the licensee (from πi(0,0,0) to
πi(0,0,1)). Hence, the net proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrms with an auction is identical
with or without access restriction. Access restriction is preferred if and only if it leads
8The lemma 6 is robust with any demand function. The proposition 2 is valid as long as
πi(0,0,1) <π i(0,0,0), a basic and rather general property. The proposition 3 follows from the
proposition 2.
9Caballero-Sanz et al. [2002] consider a similar model based on a circular rather than a linear
layout of the consumers, and a quadratic rather than a linear transportation cost. Despite these
diﬀerences, the results are qualitatively identical to those obtained by Poddar and Sinha [2004]
24to an increase of the industry proﬁt (either with or without vertical integration).10
Finally, vertical integration cannot lead to a change of the access restriction as it is a
case with a ﬁxed fee (cf. proposition 3). The patent holder has no interest for vertical
integration with auction.
Sandon´ ıs and Faul´ ı-Oller [2003] consider the same model than the one used in this
paper, but with two-part tariﬀ. They show ﬁrst that there is no interest for access
restriction either with or without vertical integration. The optimal royalty level is
a compromise between two opposite eﬀects: on the one hand, the patent holder has
an interest to decrease the royalty level in order to decrease the net proﬁt let to the
licensee; but on the other hand, the patent holder has an interest to keep the royalty
level at a rather high level in order to moderate the competition on the ﬁnal market
and to preserve the industry proﬁt. The more important is the innovation, the lower
is the net proﬁt of the licensee, and the easier it is for the patent holder to get a
good compromise. The interest of vertical integration is to decrease the proﬁt let
to the licensee, but the drawback is that it leads to lower industry proﬁt.11 Finally,
the patent holder prefers to integrate vertically with a small innovation and not to
integrate vertically with large enough innovation. This choice leads to a decrease of
the social surplus. Indeed, with moderate innovation, the surplus is greater with no
vertical integration because the patent holder is then forced to apply a lower royalty
level which leads to a lower prices on the ﬁnal market. Conversely, with important
innovation, the surplus is greater with vertical integration because it decreases the
loss associated with the double margin.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the interest of an upstream patent holder to integrate vertically a
downstream potential licensee in a context where either a ﬁxed fee or a royalty based
license can be used. Two main cases have to be distinguished in order to summarise
the results. In the ﬁrst case, only a royalty based license is possible. The patent
10Formally we have:
ΠNI(0,1,1)−2πi(0,0,1) > ΠNI(0,1,0)− 2πi(0,0,1)
⇔ ΠNI(0,1,1) > ΠNI(0,1,0) ⇔ ΠI(0,1) > ΠI(0,0)
⇔ ΠI(0,1) − πs(0,0) > ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0)
11The proﬁt let to the licensee is lower with vertical integration because he faces a the subsidiary
of the vertically integrated company who has access to the innovation for free. Industry proﬁt could
be higher with vertical integration when the royalty level is high, but this situation never appears
at the equilibrium with two-part tariﬀ.
25holder has then always an interest for vertical integration and this choice generally
leads to an increase of the social surplus. For the patent holder, vertical integration
has two positive eﬀects (part of the double margin is eliminated and the proﬁt let to
the licensee decreases) that always overcomes one negative eﬀect (the more intense
competition that leads to a decrease of the industry proﬁt). The second case is when
a ﬁxed fee can be used. Vertical integration is preferred when it enables the patent
holder to change qualitatively its licensing strategy: to move from no access restriction
to access restriction when only a ﬁxed fee is possible, or to move from a ﬁxed fee to
a royalty when both types of license are possible. Vertical integration leads either to
an increase or a decrease of the social surplus.
These results complete those from Sandon´ ıs and Faul´ ı-Oller [2003] who show ﬁrst
that vertical integration can be preferred when the innovation is small and second that
such a choice leads to a decrease of the social surplus. This analysis by Sandon´ ıs and
Faul´ ı-Oller [2003] leads to the clear-cut policy recommendation that vertical mergers
motivated by patent licensing should be forbidden per se. In this paper, we show the
result with two-part tariﬀ is not robust with respect to the type of licensing contract.
More precisely, if for some reason the patent holder cannot combine a royalty and a
ﬁxed fee, but is constrained to use only one of the two instruments, then some vertical
mergers should not be forbidden. Hence, a rule of reason approach should be used to
analyse such vertical merger cases, and a particular attention should be paid to the
type of licensing contract used by the patent holder.
Policy recommendation can be strengthened by several development of the cur-
rent model. First, one have to analyse the robustness of the result with respect to
the number of downstream ﬁrms. The optimal licensing contract with an arbitrary
number of downstream ﬁrms has been analysed in the literature either with or with-
out vertical integration and with diﬀerent types of payment structure12. However,
no contribution analyses the interest of the patent holder for vertical integration in
such a context. Second, when considering product innovation as we do in this pa-
per, one should consider the case with vertical diﬀerentiation where the two types of
products (the one that incorporate the innovation, and the one that does not) have
positive sales. Avenel and Caprice [2003] consider a very similar case in a context
with a manufacturer and two retailers and two part tariﬀ contacts. Some results are
qualitatively diﬀerent compared to those obtained by by Sandon´ ıs and Faul´ ı-Oller
[2003]13, but these diﬀerences could be explained by the use of diﬀerent demand func-
12With a ﬁxed fee or a royalty, the optimal contract has been analysed by Kamien and Tauman
[1986] in a context with no vertical integration and by Kamien and Tauman [2002] in a context with
vertical integration. With two-part tariﬀ, Sen and Tauman [2003] analyse the optimal contract.
13In Avenel and Caprice [2003] the production cost of the high quality product by the upstream
ﬁrm can be higher compared to the low quality product. The case considered here with innovation
licensing is a particular case of there paper, where the production costs are identical. In such a case,
26tions. Third, the dynamic eﬀect on the incentive to invest in research should also be
addressed. More precisely, what would be the eﬀect of the vertical integration, after
a ﬁrst generation of innovation, on the incentive to invest in research for a second
generation of innovation?
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28Appendix (Cournot competition)
A Prices and quantities at the stage 3 equilibrium
- With no vertical integration. At the duopoly equilibrium, the quantity, price and
proﬁt are:
qi(w,θi,θ j)=
(2 − λ)(a − c)+( 2 θi − λθj)(δ − w)
b(4 − λ2)
pi(w,θi,θ j)=c + θjw +
(2 − λ)(a − c)+( 2 θi − λθj)(δ − w)
4 − λ2
πi(w,θi,θ j)=
((2 − λ)(a − c)+( 2 θi − λθj)(δ − w))2
b(4 − λ2)2
We can check that if i does not incorporate the innovation but its competitor j does it
(θi =0e tθj = 1), then, at the stage 3 equilibrium, i supply a positive quantity with a
positive margin if δ<δ M + w with δM =( 2− λ)(a − c)/λ.I f θi = θj = 1, the quantities
are positive if w<a− c + δ. This condition is always fulﬁlled at the equilibrium because,
otherwise, the patent holder who deﬁnes w, would make no proﬁt.
At the monopoly equilibrium, the quantities, prices and proﬁts are:
qi(w,1,0) =
a − c + δ − w
2b
qi(w,0,1) = 0
pi(w,1,0) = c + w +




(a − c + δ − w)2
4b
πi(w,0,1) = 0
This case appears only if δ ≥ δM + w.T h eq u a n t i t ys o l db yi is positive if w<a− c + δ.
This condition is always fulﬁlled at the equilibrium because, otherwise, the patent holder
who deﬁnes w, would make no proﬁt.
- With vertical integration. With a duopoly equilibrium, the quantity, price and
proﬁt of the ﬁrm s are:
qs(w,θs)=
(2 − λ)(a − c) − λδ +2 θs(δ − w)
b(4 − λ2)
ps(w,θs)=c + θsw +
(2 − λ)(a − c) − λδ +2 θs(δ − w)
4 − λ2
πs(w,θs)=
((2 − λ)(a − c) − λδ +2 θs(δ − w))2
b(4 − λ2)2
If θs =0 ,s sells positive quantities with a positive markup if δ<δ M (otherwise there is
a monopoly equilibrium). If θs =1 ,s sells positive quantities with a positive markup if
w<(a − c + δ)(2 − λ)/2. This condition is always fulﬁlled at the equilibrium.
29The quantity, price and proﬁt of the ﬁrm v are:
qv(w,θs)=
(2 − λ)(a − c)+2 δ − λθs(δ − w)
b(4 − λ2)
pv(w,θs)=c +
(2 − λ)(a − c)+2 δ − λθs(δ − w)
4 − λ2
πv(w,θs)=qv(w,θs)(pv(w,θs) − c)+qs(w,θs) · w
T h e r ei sn os i m p l ee x p r e s s i o no ft h ep r o ﬁ to ft h eﬁ r mv.
With a monopoly equilibrium, quantities, prices and proﬁts are:
qv(0,0) =
a − c + δ
2b
qs(0,0) = 0
pv(0,0) = c +




(a − c + δ)2
4b
πs(0,0) = 0
This equilibrium appears if θs =0a n dδ ≥ δM.
B Analysis of industry proﬁt with a royalty and
no access restriction
We have only to consider a duopoly equilibrium because there is no access restriction. We
present here the simplest proof based on analytical resolution. A more instructive (but
longer) proof can be provided by the author.
Since prices and quantities are linear function of w, the proﬁt of the patent holder and
the two licensees are quadratic in w, and consequently the industry proﬁt is also quadratic
in w.





(a − c + δ)2 +( a − c + δ)λw − (1 + λ)w2





(a − c + δ)2 +
1
2




We can check that the industry proﬁt is concave in w. Moreover, the industry proﬁt is





(a − c + δ)λw −
4 − 3λ2
2(2 − λ)2w2 > (a − c + δ)λw − (1 + λ)w2
⇔ w>w NI/I with: wNI/I =( a − c + δ)
λ(2 − λ)2
4 − 3λ2 +2 λ3
30C Eﬀect of vertical integration on the licensee’s
proﬁt with a royalty
We show here that the proﬁt of the licensee with a royalty (and no access restriction) is
lower with vertical integration. Three cases need to be distinguished:
1) If δ>δ NI, then w∗
I =˜ wI and w∗
NI =˜ wNI. After compilation we have:
πi(˜ wNI,1,1) − πs(˜ wI,1) =
λ(64 − 32λ − 7λ2)
4b(2 + λ)2(8 − 3λ2)2 · (a − c + δ)2 > 0
2) If δI <δ<δ NI, then w∗
I =˜ wI and w∗
NI =ˆ wNI.W eh a v eπi(ˆ wNI,1,1) >π i(˜ wNI,1,1)
because ˆ wNI < ˜ wNI and because proﬁt of the licensee is decreasing in w.M o r e o v e r w e
showed that πi(˜ wNI,1,1) >π s(˜ wI,1) in the previous paragraph. Consequently, we have
πi(ˆ wNI,1,1) >π s(˜ wI,1).
3) If δ<δ I, then w∗
I =ˆ wI and w∗
NI =ˆ wNI. After compilation we have:
πi(ˆ wNI,1,1) − πs(ˆ wI,1) =
δλ(2(2 − λ)(a − c) − λδ)
b(4 − λ2)
This diﬀerence is always positive when δ<δ I.
D Interest of the patent holder for vertical inte-
gration with a royalty
With a royalty license, we have seen that the patent holder have no interest for partial or
complete access restriction. Three cases need to be considered as in the previous section.
1) If δ<δ I <δ NI, then w∗
I =ˆ wI and w∗
NI =ˆ wNI. Vertical integration increases the
proﬁt of the patent holder:
(ΠI(ˆ wI,1) − πs(ˆ wI,1))−(ΠNI(ˆ wNI,1,1) − πi(ˆ wNI,1,1)) =
δ(δ(4 − 4λ + λ3)+λ2(2 − λ)(a − c))
b(4 − λ2)2 > 0
2) If δI <δ<δ NI, then w∗
I =˜ wI and w∗
NI =ˆ wNI. The patent holder prefers to
integrate vertically because of the the following inequalities:
ΠI(˜ wI,1) − πs(˜ wI,1) > ΠI(ˆ wI,1) − πs(ˆ wI,1) > ΠNI(ˆ wNI,1,1) − πi(ˆ wNI,1,1)
The ﬁrst part of the inequality comes from the fact that the proﬁt of v is greater when
the optimal royalty level is unconstrained rather than constrained. The second part of the
inequality was established in the previous paragraph for any value of δ.
313) If δI <δ NI <δ , then w∗
I =˜ wI and w∗
NI =˜ wNI. The patent holder prefers to
vertically integrate because it leads to an increase of the industry proﬁt and a decrease of
the proﬁt let to the licensee. The decrease of the licensee proﬁt comes from the lemma 4.
The increase of the industry proﬁt can be shown has follow:
ΠNI(˜ wNI,1,1) < ΠNI(˜ wI,1,1) < ΠI(˜ wI,1)
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact ˜ wI < ˜ wNI and that the industry proﬁt is decreasing
when the optimal royalty level is unconstrained (lemma 2). The second inequality comes
from the fact that the unconstrained royalty with vertical is greater than wNI/I:
˜ wI − wNI/I =
(2 − λ)(16 − 24λ +1 4 λ3 + λ4 − 2λ5)
2(8 − 3λ2)(4 − 3λ2 +2 λ3)
· (a − c + δ) > 0
Remind that if w>w NI/I we have ΠNI(w,1,1) < ΠI(w,1) (lemma 1).
E Deﬁnition and properties of the ﬁxed fee with
no vertical integration
Since w = 0, the monopoly equilibrium appears if only one ﬁrm incorporates the innovation
(θi  = θj) and if the innovation is drastic (δ ≥ δM).
- Deﬁnition of F2. Remind that F2 = πi(0,1,1) − πi(0,0,1) and that the net proﬁt of
the licensee is πi(0,0,1). With a non-drastic innovation, the patent holder cannot extract
all the proﬁt of the licensees (πi(0,0,1) > 0). Conversely, with a drastic innovation, the








4δ((2 − λ)(a − c)+δ(1 − λ))
b(4 − λ2)2 if δ<δ M
(a − c + δ)2
b(2 + λ)2 otherwise
(5)
- Deﬁnition of F1. Remind that F1 = πi(0,1,0) − πi(0,0,0) and that the net proﬁt of
the licensee is πi(0,0,0). Whatever the type of innovation, the patent holder cannot extract
all the proﬁt of the licensees. (πi(0,0,0) > 0). πi(0,1,0) corresponds to the duopoly proﬁt if








4δ((2 − λ)(a − c)+δ)
b(4 − λ2)2 if δ<δ M
(λ(a − c)+( 2+λ)δ)((4 + λ)(a − c)+( 2+λ)δ)
4b(2 + λ)2 otherwise
(6)
32-C o m p a r i s o no fF2 and F1. With a non-drastic (δ<δ M) innovation we have:
F1 − F2 =
4λδ2
b(4 − λ2)2 > 0
With a drastic innovation, we have:
F1 − F2 =
λ(4 + λ)
4(2 + λ)2δ2 +
λ(4 + λ)
2(2 + λ)2 · (a − c)δ −
4 − 4λ − λ2
4(2 + λ)2 · (a − c)2
This expression is positive because it is convex in δ and the two roots are lower than δM.
F Interest of vertical integration with a ﬁxed fee
or a royalty
- Interest for the patent holder
This section provides the proof that the patent holder always prefers to integrate vertically
in the case where he prefers to apply a royalty (rather than a ﬁxed fee) with vertical inte-
gration and the converse with no vertical integration. Two sub-cases have to be considered
depending on whether the patent holder prefers to restrict the access restriction with no
vertical integration (and a ﬁxed fee).
Consider ﬁrst the case where the patent holder does not restrict the access with no




I,1) ≥ ΠI(0,1) − πs(0,0)
⇔ ΠI(w∗
I,1) − πs(w∗
I,1) ≥ [ΠNI(0,1,1) − 2πi(0,0,1)] + πi(0,0,1)
The equivalence is based on the fact that the proﬁt with a ﬁxed fee are equivalent with or
without vertical integration (cf. lemma 6). The term on the right hand side of the second
inequality is the joint proﬁt of the patent holder (in squared brackets) and the licensee with
ﬁxed fee, no vertical integration, and no access restriction. Hence the patent holder prefers
to integrate vertically.
The same type of equivalence can be established when the patent holder prefers to re-




I,1) ≥ ΠI(0,0) − πs(0,0)
⇔ ΠI(w∗
I,1) − πs(w∗
I,1) ≥ [ΠNI(0,1,0) − πi(0,0,0) − πi(0,0,1)] + πi(0,0,0)
33- Welfare impact of vertical integration
With no vertical integration, the patent holder always prefers a ﬁxed fee to a royalty, but he
can either or not prefers to restrict the access. With vertical integration, the patent holder
can either prefers a ﬁxed fee to a royalty or the converse, but he has no interest for access
restriction.
Four potential potential cases have to be considered. Using the proposition 2, we can
observe that it is not possible to have a case where the patent holders prefers a ﬁxed fee
and access restriction with no vertical integration, and a ﬁxed fee plus access restriction
with vertical integration. Hence, only three cases have to be considered.
1) If the patent holders prefers a ﬁxed fee and no access restriction both with or without
vertical integration, then the stage 3 equilibrium are identical both with or without vertical
integration. The patent holder has no interest for vertical integration, and the social surplus
is identical with or without vertical integration.
2) If the patent holders prefers a ﬁxed fee and no access restriction with no vertical inte-
gration and a royalty with vertical integration, then he prefers to integrate vertically. The
two products incorporate the innovation, but the prices are higher with vertical integration
because of the royalty. Hence vertical integration leads to a decrease of the social surplus.
3) If the patent holders prefers a ﬁxed fee and access restriction with no vertical inte-
gration, then he prefers a royalty to a ﬁxed fee with vertical integration. With no vertical
integration, the production cost is at the minimum level but the innovation is incorporated
in only one product. With vertical integration, the innovation is incorporated in the two
products but the production cost of the licensee is higher than the marginal cost because of
the royalty. The compilation of the social surplus is necessary to analyse the welfare eﬀect
of vertical integration. Social surplus is deﬁned as follow:




i +2 λqiqj + q2
j)




(2 − λ)(1 − λ)(14 − 3λ − 6λ2)
2(8 − 3λ2)2 ·
(a + δ − c)2
b
> 0
Note that the patent holder prefers to restrict the access with a ﬁxed fee only if the inno-
vation is radical (δ>δ M), so that qi(0,0,1) = 0.
In conclusion, if the patent holder prefers to integrate vertically, it leads either to an
increase or a decrease of the social surplus depending on the access restriction he would
decide with no vertical integration. Vertical integration leads to an increase (resp. decrease)
of the social surplus if the patent holder would decide to restrict the access (resp. not to
restrict the access) with no vertical integration. Moreover, there is no loss of surplus when
the patent holder prefers not to integrate vertically.
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